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Abstract
In this paper dedicated to the memory of Walter Philipp, we for-
malize the rules of classical→ quantum correspondence and perform
a rigorous mathematical analysis of the assumptions in Bell’s NO-GO
arguments.
I met Walter Philipp on many occasions — mostly during the Va¨xjo¨
conferences and during my visits to the University of Illinois in Urbana-
Champaign — and I always enjoyed social and scientific contacts with him.
It was impressive that he always behaved as if he had just moved recently
from Vienna (which in fact he had left as early as the 60th to move to
Illinois): he was a man of great European cultural level, with a deep sense
of humor, and he exhibited them both through uncountable stories about
writers, poets, artists and scientists from Vienna.
Our common scientific interest was the mathematical formalization of
Bell’s arguments [1] which are widely known as Bell’s NO-GO theorem. Con-
tacts with Walter were very attractive for me, because we both had the same
background: a specialization in probability theory. I was really happy to find
in Walter a fellow mathematician with whom discussions on Bell’s theorem
could be made in the language of mathematically rigorous statements. Wal-
ter and I shared the common viewpoint — one that I have been trying to
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advocate to physicists since the first conference in Va¨xjo¨, on ”Foundations
of Probability and Physics” [2, 3, 4] — that without a rigorous mathemati-
cal formalization of the probabilistic content of Bell’s arguments one cannot
forcefully derive the fundamental dilemma that we are often being offered:
that is, either nonlocality or the death of reality [5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Our main point was that any mathematical theorem (when formulated
in rigorous mathematical terms) is based on a list of assumptions. If such a
precise list is not provided, then one cannot call it a mathematical theorem,
and should not make any definitive conclusions. It was pointed out on many
occasions, both by Walter Philipp and his collaborator Karl Hess, see e.g.
[10]–[13], as well as by Luigi Accardi, see e.g. [14, 15], and myself [16]–
[19], that without a presentation of a precise probabilistic model for Bell’s
framework, one cannot proceed in a rigorous way.
If one uses the Kolmogorov measure-theoretic model then one should be
aware that there is no reason, even in classical physics, to assume that sta-
tistical data that were obtained in different experiments should be described
by a single Kolmogorov probability space, see e.g. [16] for details. Walter
Philipp strongly supported this kind of counterarguments by finding a purely
mathematical investigations in probability which were devoted to a similar
problem, but without any relation to quantum physics. In particular, Walter
found a theorem (proved by a Soviet mathematician Vorob’ev[20]) describing
the conditions which are necessary and sufficient for the realization of a few
random variables on a single Kolmogorov space.
We remark that Vorob’ev’s theorem was proved before the inequality
which is nowadays known as Bell’s inequality appeared in quantum physics.
Vorob’ev applied his results to game theory. He noticed: ”In application to
the theory of games the foregoing means that a combination of players into
groups can be found, the mixed coordinated actions of these groups cannot
determine any mixed manner of action for all the players of the game which
is consistent with the actions of these groups. The types of questions, de-
veloped in line with the requirements of the theory of coalition games, can
find future applications also in the theory of information and the theory of
random algorithms,” [20], p. 147-148.
Unfortunately, studies of N. N. Vorob’ev were not supported by math-
ematical probabilistic establishment. In modern probability theory people
traditionally operate in a single Kolmogorov probability space. Typically
a mathematical paper in probability is started with the sentence: ”Let
P = (Ω,F ,P) be a Kolmogorov probability space.” Then everything should
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happen in this chosen once and for ever probability space. When I started to
develop so called contextual probability theory, i.e., a theory of probability
in that any context (a complex of physical or biological, or social conditions)
determines its own probability space [21], [22], the former students of Kol-
mogorov, Albert Shiryaev and Alexander Bulinskii, paid my attention to the
fact that Kolmogorov by himself always underlined the role of a context in
determining a probability space of an experiment [23], [24], see also Gnedenko
[25] and Shiryaev [26].
Walter Philipp and his collaborator Karl Hess demonstrated [10]–[13] that
for some extended models cotaining time as one of hidden variables the using
of a single Kolmogorov probability space was not justified.
However, in physical literature it was often pointed out that in Bell’s
framework one need not use the Kolmogorov measure-theoretic model at all,
because it is possible to operate just with frequencies. As was remarked first
by De Baere [27] and then by Khrennikov [16], the frequency derivation of
Bell’s inequality is also based on mixing of statistical data from different
experiments. Such a procedure was not totally justified. If we proceed in
a rigorous mathematical way by using the von Mises frequency approach
(which was recently presented on the mathematical level in [16]), then we
shall immediately see that it is impossible to obtain Bell’s inequality without
additional assumptions. It is amazing that very soon Walter Philipp came
independently to the same conclusion. It seems that everybody who was
educated in probability theory should see such a problem.
We remark that there can be obtained generalized Bell-type inequalities
which are not violated by the experimental statistical data taken from dif-
ferent experiments [16]–[18].
In this paper I would like to continue the ”mathematical line” in analysing
Bell’s arguments. I would like to formalize the rules of classical→quantum
correspondence. And we shall see that it is not so simple task. The first step
in this direction was done by von Neumann when he formulated the first NO-
GO statement for existence a prequantum classical statistical model [28]. J.
Bell continued this activity by starting with heavy critical arguments against
von Neumann’s formalization. We proceed in the same way. Our analysis
showed that Bell’s formalization was far from to be complete.
I think such a mathematical analysis of Bell’s arguments would be the
best memorial in the honor of Walter Philipp.
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1 Derivation of Bell’s inequality
By the Kolmogorov axiomatics [23], see also [24], [25], [26] the probability
space is a triple
P = (Ω,F ,P),
where Ω is an arbitrary set, F is an arbitrary σ-algebra1 of subsets of Ω, P
is a σ-additive measure on F which yields values in the segment [0, 1] of the
real line and normalized by the condition P(Ω) = 1.
Random variables on P are by definition measurable functions
ξ : Ω→ R. (1)
Thus ξ−1(B) ∈ F for every B ∈ B, where B is the Borel σ-algebra on the
real line.
Let P = (Ω,F ,P) be a Kolmogorov probability space. For any pair of
random variables u(ω), v(ω), their covariation is defined by
< u, v >= cov(u, v) =
∫
Ω
u(ω) v(ω) dP(ω).
We reproduce the proof of Bell’s inequality in the measure-theoretic frame-
work.
Theorem 1. (Bell inequality for covariations) Let ξa, ξb, ξc = ±1 be
random variables on P. Then Bell’s inequality
| < ξa, ξb > − < ξc, ξb > | ≤ 1− < ξa, ξc > (2)
holds.
Proof. Set ∆ =< ξa, ξb > − < ξc, ξb > . By linearity of Lebesgue integral
we obtain
∆ =
∫
Ω
ξa(ω)ξb(ω)dP(ω)−
∫
Ω
ξc(ω)ξb(ω)dP(ω) =
∫
Ω
[ξa(ω)−ξc(ω)]b(ω)dP(ω).
(3)
As
ξa(ω)
2 = 1, (4)
we have:
|∆| = |
∫
Ω
[1− ξa(ω)ξc(ω)]ξa(ω)ξb(ω)dP(ω)| ≤
∫
Ω
[1− ξa(ω)ξc(ω)]dP(ω). (5)
1In literature one also uses the terminology σ-field, instead of σ-algebra.
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2 Correspondence between classical and quan-
tum models
It is assumed that there exists a space of hidden variables Ω representing
states of individual physical systems. There is fixed a σ-algebra F of subsets
of Ω. On this space there are defined classical quantities. These are mea-
surable functions ξ : Ω → R – random variables on the measurable space
(Ω,F). 2
There is also considered a space of physical observables O. In the quantum
model they are represented by self-adjoint operators, e.g., we can represent
O by Ls(H) – the space of bounded self-adjoint operators in the Hilbert
space of quantum states H. We shall distinguish a physical observable and
its operator-representative by using symbols: a and aˆ.
The main question is about existence of a correspondence between the
space of random variables V (Ω) and the space of quantum observables Ls(H)
– about the possibility to construct a map
j : V (Ω)→ Ls(H) (6)
or a map
i : Ls(H)→ V (Ω) (7)
which have “natural probabilistic properties” (in general j is not a one-to-
one map; its existence does not imply existence of i and vice versa). The
main problem is that physics does not tell us which features such maps should
have. There is a huge place for mathematical fantasies (presented in the form
of various NO-GO theorems). We now recall the history of this problem.
3 Von Neumann’s formalization
J. von Neumann was the first who presented a list of possible features of the
classical→quantum map j, see [28]:
2In this framework classical is equivalent to existence of a functional representation.
Denote the space of classical quantities by the symbol V (Ω). This is some space of real-
valued (measurable) functions on Ω. The choice of this functional space depends on a
model under consideration. For a system which state is given by the hidden variable
ω, the value ξ(ω) of a classical quantity ξ gives the objective property ξ of this system.
We shall not distinguish a classical (physical) quantity and its representation by random
variable.
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VN1). j is one-to-one map.3
VN2). For any Borel function f : R→ R, we have j(f(ξ)) = f(j(ξ)), ξ ∈
V (Ω).
VN3). j(ξ1+ξ2+ ...) = j(ξ1)+j(ξ2)+ ... for any any sequence ξk ∈ V (Ω).4
Any statistical model contains a space of statistical states. In a pre-
quantum statistical model (which we are looking for) statistical states are
represented by probability measures on the space of hidden variables Ω. De-
note such a space of probabilities by S(Ω). This space is chosen depending
on a classical statistical model under consideration.5 In the quantum model
statistical states are represented by von Neumann density operators. This
space is denoted by D(H).
Roughly speaking J. von Neumann proved that under conditions VN1-
VN3 every operation of statistical averaging on V (Ω) can be represented
as the quantum trace-average on Ls(H) corresponding to a quantum state
ρ ∈ D(H). By using the language of probability measures we can say that
every probability measure P on Ω can be represented by a quantum state ρ
and vice versa. Thus we have the following “theorem” (von Neumann did
not proceed in the rigorous mathematical framework):
Theorem 2. (von Neumann) Under conditions VN1-VN3 (and some
additional technical conditions) there is well defined map j : S(Ω) → D(H)
which one-to-one and∫
Ω
ξ(ω)dP(ω) = Tr ρ aˆ, where ρ = j(P), aˆ = j(ξ). (8)
By using Theorem 2 J. von Neumann “proved” (he did not formulate a
theorem, but just ansatz) [28]:
3Different random variables from the space V (Ω) are mapped into different quantum
observables (injectivity) and any quantum observable corresponds to some random variable
belonging V (Ω) (surjectivity).
4As J. von Neumann remarked: “the simultaneous measurability of j(ξ1), j(ξ2), ... is
not assumed”, see [28], p. 314.
5For example, in classical statistical mechanics S(Ω) is the space of all probability
measures on phase space Ω = R2n. In a prequantum classical statistical field theory which
was developed in a series of works [29],[30] the space of hidden variables Ω is infinite-
dimensional phase space, space of classical fields, and the space of statistical states S(Ω)
consists of Gaussian measures having very small dispersion.
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Theorem 3. (Von Neumann) Let the space of statistical states S(Ω) con-
tains probabilities having zero dispersion. A correspondence map j between
a classical statistical model
Mcl = (S(Ω), V (Ω))
and the quantum statistical model
Nquant = (D(H),Ls(H))
satisfying the postulates V1–V3 (and some additional technical conditions
[28]) does not exist.
4 Bell’s NO-GO theorem
As was pointed out by many outstanding physicists (e.g., by J. Bell [1] and
L. Ballentine [31]), some of von Neumann postulates of classical→ quan-
tum correspondence are nonphysical. In the opposition to von Neumann, in
Bell-type NO-GO theorem different classical quantities can correspond to the
same quantum observable. It is not assumed that every self-adjoint opera-
tor corresponds to some classical quantity. It might be that some self-adjoint
operators have no classical counterpart (or even physical meaning). The pos-
tulate V1 was deleted from the list for classical → quantum correspondence.
The most doubtful postulate V3 was also excluded from considerations. It
was not assumed that the V2 holds.
We consider a family of spin operators:
σˆ(θ) = cos θσˆz + sin θσˆx,
where σˆx, σˆz are Pauli matrices, θ ∈ [0, 2pi). These operators act in the two
dimensional state space H = C2.We also consider spin operators for pairs of
1/2-spin particles: σˆ(θ)⊗ I and I ⊗ σˆ(θ). They act in the four dimensional
state space H = C2 ⊗C2.
Bell’s list of postulates on classical → quantum correspondence can be
described as following:
B1). The image j(V (Ω)) contains spectral projectors for operators σˆ(θ)⊗
I and I ⊗ σˆ(θ) for pairs of 1/2-spin particles.
B2). For any random variable ξ ∈ V (Ω), its range of values ξ(Ω) coincides
with the spectrum of the operator aˆ = j(ξ).
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B3). The image j(S(Ω)) contains the singlet spin state6
ψ =
1√
2
(|+ > |− > −|− > |+ >)
Starting with any classical→quantum mapping j we can construct a map
i from quantum observables to classical random variables by setting for aˆ ∈
j(V (Ω)),
i(aˆ) = ξa,
where ξa belongs to the set of random variables j
−1(aˆ). We also construct
a map (denoted by the same symbol i) from the space of von Neumann
density operators into the space of classical probability measures by choosing
a probability measure Pρ belonging the set j
−1(ρ). We emphasize that such
maps
i : Ls(H)→ V (Ω)
and
i : D(H)→ S(Ω)
are not uniquely defined! We also point out to a purely mathematical problem
of transition from classical→quantum to quantum→classical correspondence.
Such a possibility is based on the Axiom of Choice. For example, for quantum
observables we have the collection of sets j−1(aˆ) of classical random variables
corresponding to self-adjoint operators. We should choose from each of these
sets one random variable and construct a new set – the classical image of
quantum observables. The using of this axiom is not commonly accepted in
the mathematical community.
We set
ξθ = i(σˆ(θ)⊗ I), ξ′θ = i(I ⊗ σˆ(θ)).
These are classical pre-images of the spin operators for pairs of 1/2-spin
particles.
J. Bell also proposed to use the following postulates:
B4). For any quantum state ρ and commuting operators aˆ, bˆ, the quan-
tum and classical correlations coincide:
< ξa, ξb >Pρ≡
∫
Ω
ξa(ω)ξb(ω)dPρ(ω) =< aˆ bˆ >ρ≡ Tr ρ aˆbˆ.
6This state belongs to the four dimensional state space H = C2 ⊗ C2. By using the
tensor notations we can write ψ = 1√
2
[|+ > ⊗|− > −|− > ⊗|+ >].
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B5). For the singlet state ψ and any θ, random variables ξθ and ξ
′
θ are
anti-correlated:
ξθ(ω) = −ξ′θ(ω) (9)
almost everywhere with respect to the probability Pψ.
Theorem 4. (Bell) Let dim H = 4. Correspondence maps
j : V (Ω)→ Ls(H) and j : S(Ω)→ D(H) (10)
satisfying the postulates B1-B5 do not exist.
Proof. We apply Bell’s inequality, Theorem 1, to random variables ξθ =
i(σˆ(θ)⊗ I), ξ′θ = i(I ⊗ σˆ(θ)) and to a probability measure Pψ corresponding
to the singlet state ψ :
| < ξθ1 , ξθ2 >Pψ − < ξθ3, ξθ2 >Pψ | ≤ 1− < ξθ1, ξθ3 >Pψ .
We remark that the postulate B2 was used here. To prove Bell’s inequality,
we took into account that random variables ξθ(ω) = ±1. We now apply the
anti-correlation postulate B5 and rewrite the Bell’s inequality:
| < ξθ1 , ξ′θ2 >Pψ − < ξθ3, ξ′θ2 >Pψ | ≤ 1+ < ξθ1, ξ′θ3 >Pψ .
Finally, we apply the postulate B4 and write quantum covariations, instead
of classical:
|Tr (ψ ⊗ ψ) (σˆ(θ1)⊗ I) (I⊗ σˆ(θ2))− Tr (ψ ⊗ ψ) (σˆ(θ3)⊗ I) (I⊗ σˆ(θ2))|
≤ 1 + Tr (ψ ⊗ ψ) (σˆ(θ1)⊗ I) (I⊗ σˆ(θ3)).
It is well known that this inequality is violated for a special choice of angles
θ1, θ2, θ3.
Our attitude with respect to Bell-type NO-GO theorems is similar to
Bell’s attitude with respect to others NO-GO theorems – von Neumann,
Jauch-Piron and Gleasons theorems, – [1], p.4-9. As well as J. Bell did, we
could speculate that some postulates about the correspondence between clas-
sical and quantum models (which were used in Bell-type NO-GO theorems)
were nonphysical. There are many things which can be questioned in Bell’s
arguments.
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5 The range of values postulate
The proofs of Bell and Wigner NO-GO theorems were based on the postulate
B2 on the coincidence of ranges of values for classical random variables and
quantum observables. Moreover, one can easily construct examples of classi-
cal random variables reproducing the EPR-Bohm correlations in the case of
violation of B2, [32].
Is the postulate B2 really implied by the physical analysis of the situa-
tion? It seems that not at all! Henry Stapp pointed out [9]: ‘ ‘The problem,
basically, is that to apply quantum theory, one must divide the fundamen-
tally undefined physical world into two idealized parts, the observed and
observing system, but the theory gives no adequate description of connection
between these two parts. The probability function is a function of degrees
of freedom of the microscopic observed system, whereas the probabilities it
defines are probabilities of responses of macroscopic measuring devices, and
these responses are described in terms of quite different degrees of freedom.”
In such a situation rejection of the range of values condition is quite natural,
since, as was pointed by Stapp, a classical random variable ξ and its quan-
tum counterpart aˆ = j(ξ) depend on completely different degrees of freedom.
Finally, we remark that a classical model reproducing quantum probabilistic
description, but violating B2, was recently developed, see [29], [30].
Conclusion. If the range of values postulates (in the forms V2, B2)
are rejected, then the classical probabilistic description does not contradict
quantum mechanics.
6 Contextual viewpoint
In this section we shall present a very general viewpoint on the role of con-
textuality in Bell-type NO-GO theorems. Bell’s original viewpoint on con-
textuality was presented in [1]. The latter contextuality we can call simulta-
neous measurement contextuality or Bell-contextuality. We reserve the term
contextuality for our general contextuality – dependence on the whole com-
plex of physical conditions for preparation and measurement. We are aware
that commonly in literature Bell-contextuality is called simply contextuality.
However, using such a terminology is rather misleading, because dependence
on the measurements of other compatible observables is just a very special
case of dependence on the general physical context.
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As was rightly pointed out by J. Bell, the only reasonable explanation of
his contextuality is action at the distance. Another possibility is often called
“death of reality” [6] – denying the possibility to assign to quantum systems
objective properties (such as the electron spin or the photon polarization) –
does not sound natural. The observation of precise (anti-)correlations for the
singlet state evidently contradicts to the latter explanation.
In contrast to Bell-contextuality, in general contextuality does not imply
action at the distance nor “death of reality.”
6.1 Non-injectivity of correspondence
We first concentrate our considerations on the classical variables→ quantum
observables correspondence. As we remember, J. Bell (as well as L. Bal-
lentine) criticized strongly the von Neumann postulate V1. Both Bell and
Ballentine (as well as many others) emphasized that there were no physical
reasons to suppose (as von Neumann did) that for a quantum observable aˆ
its classical pre-image
j−1(aˆ) = {ξ ∈ V (Ω) : j(ξ) = aˆ}
should contain just one random variable.7
We now consider the classical probabilities → quantum states correspon-
dence. In the same way as for variables and observables there are no physical
reasons to assume injectivity of the map j : S(Ω)→ D(H). By saying that we
prepared an ensemble of systems with the fixed quantum state ρ we could not
guarantee that we really prepared the fixed classical probability distribution.
The set
j−1(ρ) = {P ∈ S(Ω) : j(P) = ρ}
might have huge cardinality.
We remark that the derivations of all Bell-type NO-GO theorems were
based on the possibility to select for any quantum state (at least for the
singlet state) one fixed classical probability measure Pρ ∈ j−1(ρ) and for any
quantum observable (at least for spin observables) the fixed random variable
ξ ∈ j−1(aˆ).
7 If one consider the quantum mechanical description as an approximative description,
cf. [], then it would be quite reasonable to assume that quantum mechanics cannot distin-
guish sharply prequantum physical variables. A few different classical random variables
ξ, η, ... can be identified in the quantum model with the same operator aˆ = j(ξ) = j(η) = ...
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6.2 Contextual opposition against Bell’s approach to
NO-GO theorems
The crucial counterargument is that at the experimental level in all Bell-type
inequalities one should use data which is obtained in a few different runs of
measurements (at least three, but in the real experimental framework four),
see [5], [27], [16]. In the light of the above discussion of the non-injectivity of
classical→ quantum correspondence there are no physical reasons to assume
that we would be able to obtain the same classical probability distribution
and the same classical random variables (for example, corresponding to spin
observables).8 We are not able to guarantee that all runs of measurements
are performed under the same physical conditions.
Let us consider a new random variable C describing a complex of physical
conditions (context) during a run of measurements. And let us try to proceed
as J. Bell and his followers did by proving inequalities for correlations and
probabilities. Now classical probability measures corresponding to a quan-
tum state ρ (in particular, to the singlet state) depend on runs C : Pρ ≡ Pρ,C
as well as random variables: ξa,C(ω), ξb,C(ω), ξc,C(ω).We start with the corre-
lation inequality. There are three different complexes of physical conditions
C1, C2, C3 inducing correlations which were considered in Theorem 1. Here
< ξa, ξb > (C1) =
∫
Ω
ξa,C1(ω)ξb,C1(ω)Pρ,C1(ω),
< ξc, ξb > (C2) =
∫
Ω
ξc,C2(ω)ξb,C2(ω)Pρ,C2(ω).
If C1 6= C2 we are not able to perform operations with integrals which we did
in Theorem 1. We can not obtain the Bell’s inequality involving the third
correlation:
< ξa, ξc > (C3) =
∫
Ω
ξa,C3(ω)ξc,C3(ω)Pρ,C3(ω)
for a context C3. To derive Bell’s inequality, we should assume that C1 =
C2 = C3.
By using the contextual framework we derived in [34], [16] generalizations
of the Bell-type inequalities. Such generalized inequalities do not contradict
8Even if we use the same macroscopic preparation and measurement devices, fluctua-
tions of micro parameters can induce different physical conditions, [27], [16].
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to predictions of quantum mechanics. We also mention that a special form
of contextuality (so called non-reproducibility condition) was also present in
arguments of De Baere [27] against Bell’s NO-GO theorem, see also [16]. So
called efficiency of detectors (or more general unfair sampling) argument [33]
can also be considered as special forms of contextuality – different contexts
produce samples with different statistical properties.
Conclusion. The main value of Bell’s arguments was the great stimula-
tion of experimental technologies for working with entangled photons.
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